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StarPilot/starpilot/third_party/http_ece/__init__.py
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firestar5683 1fe6a5011a it's CarniVAl
2026-08-15 22:30:04 -05:00

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Python

import functools
import os
import struct
from cryptography.exceptions import InvalidTag
from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.hkdf import HKDF
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms, modes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import Encoding, PublicFormat
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
MAX_RECORD_SIZE = pow(2, 31) - 1
MIN_RECORD_SIZE = 3
KEY_LENGTH = 16
NONCE_LENGTH = 12
TAG_LENGTH = 16
# Valid content types (ordered from newest, to most obsolete)
versions = {
"aes128gcm": {"pad": 1},
"aesgcm": {"pad": 2},
"aesgcm128": {"pad": 1},
}
class ECEException(Exception):
"""Exception for ECE encryption functions"""
def __init__(self, message):
self.message = message
def derive_key(
mode, version, salt, key, private_key, dh, auth_secret, keyid, keylabel="P-256"
):
"""Derive the encryption key
:param mode: operational mode (encrypt or decrypt)
:type mode: enumerate('encrypt', 'decrypt)
:param salt: encryption salt value
:type salt: str
:param key: raw key
:type key: str
:param private_key: DH private key
:type key: object
:param dh: Diffie Helman public key value
:type dh: str
:param keyid: key identifier label
:type keyid: str
:param keylabel: label for aesgcm/aesgcm128
:type keylabel: str
:param auth_secret: authorization secret
:type auth_secret: str
:param version: Content Type identifier
:type version: enumerate('aes128gcm', 'aesgcm', 'aesgcm128')
"""
context = b""
keyinfo = ""
nonceinfo = ""
def build_info(base, info_context):
return b"Content-Encoding: " + base + b"\0" + info_context
def derive_dh(mode, version, private_key, dh, keylabel):
def length_prefix(key):
return struct.pack("!H", len(key)) + key
if isinstance(dh, ec.EllipticCurvePublicKey):
pubkey = dh
dh = dh.public_bytes(Encoding.X962, PublicFormat.UncompressedPoint)
else:
pubkey = ec.EllipticCurvePublicKey.from_encoded_point(ec.SECP256R1(), dh)
encoded = private_key.public_key().public_bytes(
Encoding.X962, PublicFormat.UncompressedPoint
)
if mode == "encrypt":
sender_pub_key = encoded
receiver_pub_key = dh
else:
sender_pub_key = dh
receiver_pub_key = encoded
if version == "aes128gcm":
context = b"WebPush: info\x00" + receiver_pub_key + sender_pub_key
else:
context = (
keylabel.encode("utf-8")
+ b"\0"
+ length_prefix(receiver_pub_key)
+ length_prefix(sender_pub_key)
)
return private_key.exchange(ec.ECDH(), pubkey), context
if version not in versions:
raise ECEException("Invalid version")
if mode not in ["encrypt", "decrypt"]:
raise ECEException("unknown 'mode' specified: " + mode)
if salt is None or len(salt) != KEY_LENGTH:
raise ECEException("'salt' must be a 16 octet value")
if dh is not None:
if private_key is None:
raise ECEException("DH requires a private_key")
(secret, context) = derive_dh(
mode=mode,
version=version,
private_key=private_key,
dh=dh,
keylabel=keylabel,
)
else:
secret = key
if secret is None:
raise ECEException("unable to determine the secret")
if version == "aesgcm":
keyinfo = build_info(b"aesgcm", context)
nonceinfo = build_info(b"nonce", context)
elif version == "aesgcm128":
keyinfo = b"Content-Encoding: aesgcm128"
nonceinfo = b"Content-Encoding: nonce"
elif version == "aes128gcm":
keyinfo = b"Content-Encoding: aes128gcm\x00"
nonceinfo = b"Content-Encoding: nonce\x00"
if dh is None:
# Only mix the authentication secret when using DH for aes128gcm
auth_secret = None
if auth_secret is not None:
if version == "aes128gcm":
info = context
else:
info = build_info(b"auth", b"")
hkdf_auth = HKDF(
algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
length=32,
salt=auth_secret,
info=info,
backend=default_backend(),
)
secret = hkdf_auth.derive(secret)
hkdf_key = HKDF(
algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
length=KEY_LENGTH,
salt=salt,
info=keyinfo,
backend=default_backend(),
)
hkdf_nonce = HKDF(
algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
length=NONCE_LENGTH,
salt=salt,
info=nonceinfo,
backend=default_backend(),
)
return hkdf_key.derive(secret), hkdf_nonce.derive(secret)
def iv(base, counter):
"""Generate an initialization vector."""
if (counter >> 64) != 0:
raise ECEException("Counter too big")
(mask,) = struct.unpack("!Q", base[4:])
return base[:4] + struct.pack("!Q", counter ^ mask)
def decrypt(
content,
salt=None,
key=None,
private_key=None,
dh=None,
auth_secret=None,
keyid=None,
keylabel="P-256",
rs=4096,
version="aes128gcm",
):
"""
Decrypt a data block
:param content: Data to be decrypted
:type content: str
:param salt: Encryption salt
:type salt: str
:param key: local public key
:type key: str
:param private_key: DH private key
:type key: object
:param keyid: Internal key identifier for private key info
:type keyid: str
:param dh: Remote Diffie Hellman sequence (omit for aes128gcm)
:type dh: str
:param rs: Record size
:type rs: int
:param auth_secret: Authorization secret
:type auth_secret: str
:param version: ECE Method version
:type version: enumerate('aes128gcm', 'aesgcm', 'aesgcm128')
:return: Decrypted message content
:rtype str
"""
def parse_content_header(content):
"""Parse an aes128gcm content body and extract the header values.
:param content: The encrypted body of the message
:type content: str
"""
id_len = struct.unpack("!B", content[20:21])[0]
return {
"salt": content[:16],
"rs": struct.unpack("!L", content[16:20])[0],
"keyid": content[21 : 21 + id_len],
"content": content[21 + id_len :],
}
def decrypt_record(key, nonce, counter, content):
decryptor = Cipher(
algorithms.AES(key),
modes.GCM(iv(nonce, counter), tag=content[-TAG_LENGTH:]),
backend=default_backend(),
).decryptor()
return decryptor.update(content[:-TAG_LENGTH]) + decryptor.finalize()
def unpad_legacy(data):
pad_size = versions[version]["pad"]
pad = functools.reduce(
lambda x, y: x << 8 | y,
struct.unpack("!" + ("B" * pad_size), data[0:pad_size]),
)
if pad_size + pad > len(data) or data[pad_size : pad_size + pad] != (
b"\x00" * pad
):
raise ECEException("Bad padding")
return data[pad_size + pad :]
def unpad(data, last):
i = len(data) - 1
for i in range(len(data) - 1, -1, -1):
v = struct.unpack("B", data[i : i + 1])[0]
if v != 0:
if not last and v != 1:
raise ECEException("record delimiter != 1")
if last and v != 2:
raise ECEException("last record delimiter != 2")
return data[0:i]
raise ECEException("all zero record plaintext")
if version not in versions:
raise ECEException("Invalid version")
overhead = versions[version]["pad"]
if version == "aes128gcm":
try:
content_header = parse_content_header(content)
except Exception:
raise ECEException("Could not parse the content header")
salt = content_header["salt"]
rs = content_header["rs"]
keyid = content_header["keyid"]
if private_key is not None and not dh:
dh = keyid
else:
keyid = keyid.decode("utf-8")
content = content_header["content"]
overhead += 16
(key_, nonce_) = derive_key(
"decrypt",
version=version,
salt=salt,
key=key,
private_key=private_key,
dh=dh,
auth_secret=auth_secret,
keyid=keyid,
keylabel=keylabel,
)
if rs <= overhead:
raise ECEException("Record size too small")
chunk = rs
if version != "aes128gcm":
chunk += 16 # account for tags in old versions
if len(content) % chunk == 0:
raise ECEException("Message truncated")
result = b""
counter = 0
try:
for i in list(range(0, len(content), chunk)):
data = decrypt_record(key_, nonce_, counter, content[i : i + chunk])
if version == "aes128gcm":
last = (i + chunk) >= len(content)
result += unpad(data, last)
else:
result += unpad_legacy(data)
counter += 1
except InvalidTag as ex:
raise ECEException("Decryption error: {}".format(repr(ex)))
return result
def encrypt(
content,
salt=None,
key=None,
private_key=None,
dh=None,
auth_secret=None,
keyid=None,
keylabel="P-256",
rs=4096,
version="aes128gcm",
):
"""
Encrypt a data block
:param content: block of data to encrypt
:type content: str
:param salt: Encryption salt
:type salt: str
:param key: Encryption key data
:type key: str
:param private_key: DH private key
:type key: object
:param keyid: Internal key identifier for private key info
:type keyid: str
:param dh: Remote Diffie Hellman sequence
:type dh: str
:param rs: Record size
:type rs: int
:param auth_secret: Authorization secret
:type auth_secret: str
:param version: ECE Method version
:type version: enumerate('aes128gcm', 'aesgcm', 'aesgcm128')
:return: Encrypted message content
:rtype str
"""
def encrypt_record(key, nonce, counter, buf, last):
encryptor = Cipher(
algorithms.AES(key),
modes.GCM(iv(nonce, counter)),
backend=default_backend(),
).encryptor()
if version == "aes128gcm":
data = encryptor.update(buf + (b"\x02" if last else b"\x01"))
else:
data = encryptor.update((b"\x00" * versions[version]["pad"]) + buf)
data += encryptor.finalize()
data += encryptor.tag
return data
def compose_aes128gcm(salt, content, rs, keyid):
"""Compose the header and content of an aes128gcm encrypted
message body
:param salt: The sender's salt value
:type salt: str
:param content: The encrypted body of the message
:type content: str
:param rs: Override for the content length
:type rs: int
:param keyid: The keyid to use for this message
:type keyid: str
"""
if len(keyid) > 255:
raise ECEException("keyid is too long")
header = salt
if rs > MAX_RECORD_SIZE:
raise ECEException("Too much content")
header += struct.pack("!L", rs)
header += struct.pack("!B", len(keyid))
header += keyid
return header + content
if version not in versions:
raise ECEException("Invalid version")
if salt is None:
salt = os.urandom(16)
(key_, nonce_) = derive_key(
"encrypt",
version=version,
salt=salt,
key=key,
private_key=private_key,
dh=dh,
auth_secret=auth_secret,
keyid=keyid,
keylabel=keylabel,
)
overhead = versions[version]["pad"]
if version == "aes128gcm":
overhead += 16
end = len(content)
else:
end = len(content) + 1
if rs <= overhead:
raise ECEException("Record size too small")
chunk_size = rs - overhead
result = b""
counter = 0
# the extra one on the loop ensures that we produce a padding only
# record if the data length is an exact multiple of the chunk size
for i in list(range(0, end, chunk_size)):
result += encrypt_record(
key_, nonce_, counter, content[i : i + chunk_size], (i + chunk_size) >= end
)
counter += 1
if version == "aes128gcm":
if keyid is None and private_key is not None:
kid = private_key.public_key().public_bytes(
Encoding.X962, PublicFormat.UncompressedPoint
)
else:
kid = (keyid or "").encode("utf-8")
return compose_aes128gcm(salt, result, rs, keyid=kid)
return result